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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
International problems call for international solutions and terrorism nowadays is far 
from an abstract phenomenon and a theoretical discussion. Since 9/11, when terrorists 
invaded into the heart of the United Nations, there is no debate on the fact that 
terrorism constitutes an emergent hazard in the 21st century.  The repeated recent 
terrorist attacks in plenty of European capitals now raise scepticism on the role of the 
international community and the participation of Europe to the “war against terror”.  
Taking for granted that “endless money forms the sinews of war” as Cicero said in his 
fifth Philippic, this dissertation aims to explore the ways by which the International 
Community, as well as the European Union, confronts the phenomenon of terrorism 
financing.  
At this point, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Thomas Papadopoulos, for 
his willingness to assist me academically, during my researching and writing efforts and 
guide me with valuable advice. Finally, a special thanks to my family for the 
motivation, understanding and emotional support during this highly demanding for me 
period.  
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Preface 
 
 
 
Most important of all, success in war depends on having enough 
money to provide whatever the enterprise needs. 
 
 
(Robert De Balsac, 1502) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nervos belli: pecuniam infinitam 
(CICERO) 
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of terrorism cannot be considered as a product of the 21st century. 
The imminence of its thread became early perceptible by the international legislators 
in a scheme however not really mature to deal with its combating. The very first 
attempt to confront it was made by the League of Nations back in the 1930s when it 
was drafted a Convention regarding this area, which though was never adopted as 
such. Despite this fact, this Convention formed the basis for the generation of the 
international counter-terrorism law. Alongside, the General Assembly and the Security 
Council of the United Nations adopted a series of resolutions in their effort to act 
proactively against possible terrorist assaults, obliging Member-States to adopt any 
measure and apply any process that would effectively prevent terrorism. The first 
resolution to stand out has been resolution 2625 of October 24th, 1970 which declares 
among others that:  
“Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting 
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present 
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.”1 
According to this resolution, every Member-State of the UN is burdened with the duty 
abstain from incentivizing terrorist acts, condemn them and resist against activities 
that may fall under the scope of terrorist attempts. This provision that simultaneously 
confers to any state the right to withstand activities that threaten its status of peace 
and security, has a more passive than active content, namely, it does not provide for 
specific measures that states should adopt neither suggests mechanisms that should 
be activated. Adversely it establishes a line upon which each state can designate its 
defence against the threat it confronts.  
                                                     
1 UNGA, ‘Resolution 2625 (1970) A/RES/25/2625’, para 1 
 Available at  http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm (last accessed 10/02/2018) 
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Thereafter, a lot of resolutions and conventions2 were adopted setting standards for 
the protection against terrorism, that unfortunately were accompanied, though, by 
very little effort of the States to apply them. It was the United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted on 19 
December 1988, that set the legal foundation for the international effort to confront 
“crime from a financial perspective by establishing new offences (i.e. money-
laundering) and new means of detecting them and seizing their proceeds, and by 
developing new procedures for international cooperation.”3 Its importance is 
concluded by the mere fact that it contributed significantly to the creation of 
specialists’ bodies, competent to designate a suitable international framework for the 
combatting of terrorism and its financing, such as the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF). 
Notwithstanding the awareness on the expansion of terrorism and in spite of the effort 
made to the direction of its suppression, it was only the attacks in the United States, 
on September 11th, 2001, that forced the international community to take serious 
command and urgent measures against the terrorist menace. The famous expression 
of Brian Jenkins in 1975 “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people 
listening and not a lot of people dead”4 which was thought for decades as crystallizing 
the true essence of terrorism, was doubted for the first time in history. As a matter of 
fact, the 9/11 terrorist attacks proved that the main objective of terrorists is to 
manifest loudly their existence and spread terror to all parts of the globe. It has now 
become obvious that terrorism is completely unpredictable and willing to take 
advantage of every single opportunity to spread fear and insecurity on the basis of an 
                                                     
2 “The UN drafted International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICFST) 
was the first legal instrument to specifically address the problem of terrorist financing on a global level. 
The ICSFT was drawn up in 1999 by the UN General Assembly. […] It is, at most, a framework 
convention. Its classical approach has made it vulnerable to the traditional problems that confront all 
international conventions: selective ratification, differences in interpretation and varied application. […] 
The major achievement of the ICFST is that it, aided by the ferocity of the attacks on New York and 
Washington, has raised awareness of the problem of terrorist financing” Alexander Conrad Culley, ‘The 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism: A Legal Tour de Force?’ 
(2007) 29 Dublin University Law Journal 397. 
3 Joel Sollier, ‘International Organizations and Initiatives’ in Wouter H Muller, Christian H Kälin and John 
G Goldsworth (eds), Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and Practice (Jonh Wiley & Sons, Ltd 
2007) 41. 
4 Jae-myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer 2006) 1. 
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ideology. This unexpected attack that cost the lives of thousands of people, inaugured 
a totally new era and founded a huge campaign to combat the threat. An international 
cooperation period was initiated and was supported by States and organizations such 
as the Security Council of the UN, the FATF, the IMF and World Bank, that had a key 
role to the financing of terrorists’ groups.  
Given the heightened current condition in Syria and in the region of Middle East, the 
expansion of ISIL and the recent terrorist attacks that ended up with thousands of 
victims, terrorism is now more present than ever before and this time is closer than 
anyone could imagine. “ISIL, which is the successor to Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), has 
undermined stability in Iraq, Syria and the broader Middle East through its terrorist 
acts and crimes against humanity, and poses an immediate threat to international 
peace and security.”5 Apart from the constant terrorist assaults that take place in the 
“home country” of the organization, numerous attacks have lately converted terrorism 
into a particle of the everyday life in a lot of countries worldwide including European 
ones and the USA, all of them supposed to have constructed a strong protective 
fortress. According to the Report of the Monitoring Team on ISIL “the threat 
emanating from ISIL is evolving, while at the same time Al-Qaida has demonstrated 
that it remains a significant threat in several regions around the globe […] such as West 
Africa, East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and retains stronger networks in their 
respective regions compared with ISIL affiliates operating in those areas”6. This is to say 
that while Al-Qaida is far from being vanished, especially in Asian and African 
territories, ISIL targets more the western hemisphere, i.e. Europeans and USA 
enclaves.  
Consequently, it is high time the international community took command to suppress 
terrorism attempts cumulatively, respecting the international legal framework and 
protecting simultaneously the fundamental human rights that form the core that 
                                                     
5 FATF, ‘Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’[2015] Fatf 1, 
10 Available at  
<www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.htm> 
(last accessed 10/12/2017) 
6 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council 20th Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Teamsubmitted pursuant to Resolution 2253 (2015) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated 
Individuals and Entities (2017) S/2017/573’, vol 573 (2017) 4. 
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terrorism intents to infringe. The ultimate prerequisite for combating terrorism is 
international cooperation, capable to guarantee rigorous and effective solutions in 
both the short and the long term. 
  
1. Terrorism Financing  
Before examining the ways by which the International Community deals with the 
financing of terror, it is critical to get to the bottom of what is referred as Terrorism 
Financing, distinguish it from similar crimes and examine the ways through which it is 
achieved in practice. The United Nations endeavoured to define TF in the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) that states: 
 
“1. Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention if 
that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willingly, 
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
a. An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or 
b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking any active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing an act. 
3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be 
necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to 
in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b)” 7 
                                                     
7 ‘International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ no 2  Available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm> (last accessed 01/02/2018) 
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Accordingly, the term Terrorism Financing shall be discerned in two parts, namely in 
what constitutes financing on the one hand and which activities can be characterized 
as terrorist attempts on the other hand.  
Commencing by defining the financing of terrorism, it shall be noted that this is quite a 
generic term and includes any activity that may provide terrorist groups with funds so 
as to fulfil their strategic plans. The term “incorporates the distinct activities of fund-
raising, storing and concealing funds, using funds to sustain terrorist organizations and 
infrastructure, and transferring funds to support or carry out specific terrorist 
attacks”8. Expressly, Terrorism Financing incorporates activities that take places in 
distant time points. These refer to money-making and its circulation or allocation 
throughout the organization and its affiliated terrorist groups.  
Having sorted out what constitutes financing of terrorist acts, it remains to agree on a 
solid definition of what terrorism is. This part, though, has provoked extended 
dubiousness and remains until today one of the most controversial issues. A common 
definition that is often used to describe terrorism makes reference to all actions that 
may disrupt peace, security and welfare of humanity (or part of it). Yet, this description 
is proved to be very confusing considering that any crime (especially if it takes place on 
a large scale) can result in the same situation commented above.  The ambiguation 
grows even further due to the absence of a solid definition even from the modern legal 
instruments and resolutions adopted by the UN, that have been specially designated 
to serve the suppression of the phenomenon. It literally constitutes an oxymoron 
endeavouring to combat a crime without having clarified its limits, framework and 
special characteristics, because under such conditions the effectiveness of the adopted 
policy would be highly questioned.  
In an attempt to define terrorism, it is necessary to observe its causes and typology. 
Three are the most common types of terrorism according to the motives that hide 
beneath the phenomenon: ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, ideological terrorism 
and religious terrorism. In the first category, what is sought is political self-
                                                     
8 The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Tackling 
the Financing of Terrorism’ (2009) 3 Available at 
<http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final.pdf> (last accessed 01/02/2018) 
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determination with characteristic examples the case of IRA and the PLO9. In the rear, 
ideological terrorist groups struggle to reverse the entire political, social and economic 
system to extreme so-called “conservative right” or “liberal left” (FARC). Finally, 
religious terrorist groups conduct terrorist activities in the name of their religious 
beliefs in order to declare their faith condemning disloyalty. Al-Qaida’s attacks on the 
US, just as the recent numerous ISIL terrorist attacks, seem to have a merged 
background that aggregates religious and nationalistic characteristics. Therefore, the 
classification of terrorist organizations is not a simple task to cope with, given that the 
vast majority of the cases encompass diverse elements, that complicate the 
distinction, such as the case of the Islamic Hamas, that is another example of 
agglomeration of both religious and political characteristics. 
Despite the numerous approaches made by the UN as well as by competent 
organizations, terrorism is far from a crystal-clear term. Political, religious, nationalistic 
and economic reasons hinder the acceptance of a universal common definition, as for 
many states the characterisation of concrete activities as terrorist activities, may 
create the need for groundbreaking changes in their status-quo, a fact probably out of 
their interests. As a consequence, the meaning of terrorism differs from country to 
county, while the UN themselves have not been capable of compromising the 
terminology gap. In any case, the afore-cited, International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, has been a useful tool guide for the 
organizations as well the UN themselves. 
 
1.1 The call for funds   
The particularity of terrorism is that it does not need a great amount of money to 
succeed its goals. Examining the financial data of a terrorist attack, they reveal that its 
costs are so trivial that may not even raise suspicion. As successfully said, terrorism 
can- and does- operate on a shoestring: “The 9/11 terrorists made use of between 
$400,000 and $500,000, but the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 probably cost in 
                                                     
9 It is reminded that the PLO although it began as a terrorist group, was later recognised as a legitimate 
political party 
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the region of $10,000.”10 What has interestingly been noted about terrorism is that the 
only cost that a terrorist group must be able to bear, is the cost of a computer. 
Actually, this argument seems far from absurd on the assumption that nowadays the 
huge progress of the technology and the informatics, have made a terrorist attack 
extremely easy to be orchestrated and even easier to be contemplated. However, 
under the present analysis, terrorism will not be conceived as a single action, that 
anybody with basic knowledge on explosives or with an ordinary driving licence11, can 
execute.   
Terrorist attacks themselves are only the tip of the iceberg and the final acts of a play 
previously extensively orchestrated to its most paltry detail. This is the case of complex 
structures and organizations with presence worldwide, such as Al Qaida, whose 
economics have been under thorough analysis, or ISIL, that lately has demonstrated a 
great potential to evolve into a global threat to peace and security12. A glimpse into the 
financial structure of Al-Qaida, the most successful terrorist organisation with the 
broadest cell network yet known, confirms the old premise that “there is no successful 
organisation without successful financing”13.  Hence, an absolute prerequisite for the 
suppression of terrorism is the exploration of the flow of the money, namely its 
recipients and the particular objectives that is supposed to serve. Undeniably, terrorist 
groups, acting for their own benefit, resemble private companies that invest for their 
establishment initially and their expansion afterwards. 
Taking for granted that the objective of terrorists’ groups is the augmentation, the 
majority of the available funds are consumed in this direction. Firstly, funds are 
indispensable for recruiting new members and training the predisposed ones. Thus, 
                                                     
10 Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about Global Money Laundering, International Crime and 
Terrorism (2006) 129  Available at 
<http://books.google.ie/books/about/Dirty_Dealing.html?id=Zb7t6gw2NoIC&pgis=1> (last accessed 
01/12/2017)  
11 See the recent terrorist attack in Barcelona (Aug.2017). In this unit it will be discussed the importance 
of financing for terrorist organizations rather than the funding of terrorist attacks as such, which can be 
trivial.   
12 The best success story of an old-style terrorist group is the case of the PLO. Its survival and transition to 
mainstream politics were primarily due to its skilful handling of finances. Initially, the PLO depended on 
donations from other Arab countries but a prudent and clever handling of long-term investment 
transformed it into a financial colossus in the Middle East that cannot be ignored any more. See Koh 11. 
13 ibid. 
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through this capital not only are covered the expenses for the fundamental facilities 
but are also enticed young -mostly- unemployed people of a certain profile14 to 
sacrifice themselves in a terrorist organization as a collateral for financial support to 
their families. This tactic has been vital for terrorist organizations. Impressive has been 
the case of FARC and M19 in Columbia, that even though until 1980 were striving to 
survive, after being involved in drug dealing and other similar activities and spending a 
significant percentage of the profits for recruitment of militia, in 1984 they managed to 
multiply the number of their followers from 200 to 10.000 people and finally 
constitute a real threat to the Colombian Government. Additionally, the terrorists need 
money in order to get access to the weaponry and armaments form the black market. 
Without solid and continuous financing, this intention is undoubtedly impossible to be 
fulfilled.  
Thirdly, most terrorist groups are keen on strengthening their roots in their home 
country or region. In order to secure a friendly approach by their own community, they 
need to pour money into social services, charities and donations. Moreover, the 
financing of small, immature or underdeveloped groups of terrorists, active in the same 
geographical area and sharing a similar background and the same vision with them, is 
critical to their expansion. This scheme adopted by powerful organizations resembles a 
holding company with several subsidiaries. This pattern has been used to describe the 
structure of Al-Qaida and the way it used its capital so as to immerse and influence 
other Islamists groups. The need for funds derives logically from the protectionism 
blueprint adopted by the controlling and most powerful organization. Another 
fundamental need to be financed by terrorist organizations is the establishment of 
concrete alliances with people of a potent status that through their social and 
economic position, as well as through their affinities, are capable to change the flow of 
the river. A distinctive example is a friendship created between Usama Bin-Laden and 
Mullah Mohamad Omar, the most influential man in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, 
based on generous offerings.  Last but not least, funding is crucial for subsidising the 
network and the several foundations of the branch-organizations that act worldwide.  
                                                     
14 According to sociology studies keener to be involved in terrorist activities are young unemployed 
people, more often of low income and education level facing economic difficulties or not fully integrated 
to the society they live in. 
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Summarising, it remains no doubt that for an organisation to be successful and able to 
attract new members, it has to make no discounts on the capital spent for training and 
maintenance of training centres, incorporation of members and establishment of 
“friendships” and “associations” with corrupted entrepreneurs, politicians, 
governments and affiliated organizations willing to offer their assistance in exchange 
for money or other assets.  
 
1.2 The sources of funds 
The only admittedly effective way to combat the financing of terrorism is sorting out 
its sources, a task which is quite complex and demands strong efforts and cooperation 
at a national and international level. According to the US Treasury Department, 
“Terrorist Groups in Europe, East Asia and Latin America rely on common criminal 
activities such as extortion, kidnapping, the narcotics trade, counterfeiting and fraud. 
Middle Eastern groups rely on commercial enterprises, donations and funds skimmed 
from charities”.15  
In this subsection are going to be presented the main paths through which terrorist 
groups worldwide receive capital to finance their previously mentioned needs.  
As the US Treasury pointed out, the funds derive partially from criminal activities such 
as drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion and kidnapping, credit card frauds, gambling, 
money laundering techniques and other activities prohibited by penal law. The trade of 
narcotics in the case of FARC, that was previously presented, serves as a good example 
of how money can flow into a terrorist organization. Also in the case of Al-Qaida, there 
have been accusations of drug trafficking although, with reserved ones as Al-Qaida is 
known for having financed its activities through other channels, that will be 
subsequently examined. In general, it can be said that terrorist organisations do not 
hesitate to take advantage of whichever means can guarantee them sufficient and 
solid capital flow without raising an overwhelming risk of detention.  
                                                     
15 Lilley 138. 
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Besides, we can distinguish between sources with of a more legitimate profile. As such, 
are described firstly the donations and charities clinched to terrorist groups by third 
parties and secondly, funds acquired through legal business activities. 
 Charities and donations are quite a common practice in Arab countries and are often 
related to religious obligations As a distinctive paradigm of donation, it is worth 
mentioning zakat, which corresponds to a special religious donation applied by Islamic 
banks to all concluded contracts or transactions. Zakat is supposed to serve charitable 
purposes and equals a minimum of 2.5 percent of one’s total savings held in the 
banking system for a full year. The respective banks withdraw from the client’s account 
amounts corresponding to a 2.5 percentage and transfer them to Islamic charitable 
organisations. Nevertheless, zakat transfers “are generally off the balance sheets and 
therefore hardly traceable; all records are destroyed as soon as transactions are 
complete”16.  Consequently, having lost access to all records and files, the is no 
warranty that the recipient and the purpose that the donation was supposed to serve 
are out of suspicion for involvement in terroristic activities.  The risk is evident; this 
method is able to breach the money chain and thus cover up a potential criminal use.  
Another interesting way through which terrorist organizations nowadays manage to 
receive funds are the modern communication networks, such as ‘Twitter’. It is a fact 
that ISIL (or its individual proponents) has repeatedly attempted to approach potential 
allies through twitter posts and personalized skype conferences.  Akin is the concept of 
crowdfunding, which lately has been spreading in more and more countries, attracting 
increased public interest and being transformed into an effective tool for gathering 
financial resources. In fact, its success is similarly owed to the internet and the social 
media that can swiftly “spread the news” and reach even the most isolated regions of 
the globe. In essence, crowdfunding combines technology with marketing and is 
actually one of the most modern and outstanding techniques applied by the ISIL. Large 
crowdfunding platforms incorporate statistical analysis as a tool that permits them to 
outline the profile of their donators and consequently target them with specialized 
projects. A common ploy is the campaigning for ‘perks’ or ‘donation tiers’. “Through 
                                                     
16 Koh 21–22. 
16 
 
‘donation tiers’, a prospective donor is better able to connect with the cause and feel 
the immediacy of donations, thereby increasing and incentivizing larger 
contributions.”17 Donation tiers, in reality, offer the donors the opportunity to know 
their donation’s impact and how this contributed to the achievement of the goal. This 
knowledge performs as a corroboration that their offering made a difference in 
practice and can affect their future decision to fund again.  
As far as it may concern legitimate business run by terrorist groups, it is 
characteristically pointed out the case of Al-Qaida and the entrepreneur Usama bin-
Laden, who maintained and ran successfully a wide network of businesses worldwide, 
comprised mainly of shell companies. Indeed, bin-Laden had established undertakings 
in several countries in Europe, Asia and North Africa, that allowed Al-Qaida to be 
present in any country with a potentially favourable commercial and legal setting while 
simultaneously receiving funds from totally distinct entities with variated activities 
spread worldwide (paper or hospital equipment industries, real estate investments 
etc). In other words, Al Qaida used for its financing donations from supporters of its 
ideology, front and shell companies, real business activities and friendships in the 
banking and government sector that allowed bin-Laden split and conceal movements 
of capital readily.  
 
1.3 Methods used for the Financing of Terrorism 
The financing of terrorist organizations may use various channels in order for the funds 
to reach their recipients and accomplish their mission. Traditional money laundering 
techniques apart from a source may also constitute a method of distribution. 
Additionally, online payment transfers, wire transfers, diamond or artwork trading and 
informal exchange mechanisms are all employed to guarantee secrecy and discretion 
regarding the nature of the funds, their origin and destination as well as the parties 
that are involved in the whole procedure.   
                                                     
17 FATF (2015), ‘Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’ 25. 
Available at www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-
organisation-isil.html (last accessed 10/12/2017) 
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The most prevalent method for financing terrorist activities, especially when it comes 
to foreign terrorist fighters, namely extremists that live outside the basis of the 
organization, is clandestine cash smuggling or smuggling of its equivalents, i.e. bearer 
negotiable instruments (checks, money orders etc), that takes place with the help of 
individuals that cross national borders transmitting smaller or larger cash amounts. 
Indeed, in the case of ISIL, have been reported various episodes of suspicious or falsely 
declared/disclosed movement of cash. 
Apart from the traditional method of cash payments, that in case of colossal amounts 
is barely effective, the most common technique to launder money and consequently 
disrupt the illicit chain as well as to fund terrorist activities, are the informal Money 
and Value Transfer Systems (MVTS) alternatively referred as alternative remittance 
systems. These systems that may be legal or illegal (black-market exchange peso 
systems, hundi and hawala) operate outside ordinary regulatory banking systems and 
may refer to the virtual (not physical) movement of money worldwide through 
unsupervised networks. According to Interpol “Hawala is an alternative or parallel 
remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to, ‘traditional’ banking 
or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of Western 
banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the world. 
It is but one of several such systems;”18 The words hawala and hundi are both used 
interchangeably, to describe the alternative remittance system.  
The operation is quite simple as a construction. Let us use as an example the case of 
the hawala, which was created and maintained until today based on cultural traditions 
of immigrants who preferred to support financially their families by transmitting 
money through this unorthodox way, that however is cheaper and globally accessible. 
Allegedly, a party wants to transmit an amount of money to somebody in another 
country. Instead of using the banking system with all its formalities, the transfer can be 
achieved by payment of the sum to an agency operating in both sender’s and 
receiver’s countries. The correspondent of the agency operating abroad is bounded to 
provide the sum of cash to the nominated receiver. The difference with a banking 
                                                     
18 Lilley 146. 
18 
 
payment is that the MVTS company will not make a wire transfer but will inform its 
correspondent by e-mail, fax or a simple phone call and ask to dispatch the respective 
amount to the nominated recipient. At a later date, the two companies will settle their 
business through cash payment or banking transfer.  
Of course, not every transaction through this remittance system is unlawful on the 
forehand but there are countries, such as India, that consider this kind of remittance 
systems illegal. Yet, these payment methods raise global suspicion nowadays because, 
although “typically developed as mechanisms by which immigrant workers sent money 
to their families, […] are now frequently used in respect of drug money”19. 
Nevertheless, the formal financial system has also been converted into a tool in the 
hands of terrorists. According to the Interpretative Note to FATF Special 
Recommendation VII, the “terms wire transfer and funds transfer refer to any 
transaction carried out on behalf of an originator person (both natural and legal) 
through a financial institution by electronic means with a view to making an amount of 
money available to a beneficiary person at another financial institution. The originator 
and the beneficiary may be the same person.” As noticed, it is the objective that may 
turn a normal business into a suspicious one.  
The tendency to take advantage of lawful operations that due to the progress of the 
technology are freely available and easily accessible to the public exists in the case of 
ISIL too.  For the financing of its activities, ISIL makes “use of both Electronic Funds 
Transfers (EFTs) via banking channels and other transfers via MVTS to areas located 
near territories where ISIL operates or designated individuals.”20The receiver of these 
transfers was often located in areas known to be a funding, logistical and smuggling 
focal point for foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist organisations  
Another method employed by terrorist organizations and used to give them access to 
the regulated financial system is registering payment instruments (especially online 
                                                     
19 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering 
and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (HART PUBLISHING 2003) 3. 
20 FATF (2015), ‘Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’ 27. 
Available at www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-
organisation-isil.html (last accessed 10/12/2017) 
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ones that guarantee relatively high anonymity) in the name of third parties. “To avoid 
detection, the organisers and facilitators of the scheme ensure ‘rotation’ of payment 
requisites (e-wallets, credit cards, mobile phone numbers, etc.), posting the relevant 
changes in information on the Internet.”21 By rotating, namely changing periodically, 
the details of the beneficiary, the account numbers and the payment methods, they 
cause perturbances to the money chain, achieving further anonymity.  
Last but not least, the progress of the technology during the last few decades, has 
generated new means and systems of payments. Consequently, new payment products 
and services have emerged. Digital virtual currencies such as bitcoin, although 
innovative, are still a not totally regulated and supervised system, particularly in less 
progressive jurisdictions. This is exactly the vulnerability that terrorist groups, just like 
ordinary criminals, try to take advantage of. According to the FATF “the US Secret 
Service has observed that criminals are looking for and finding virtual currencies that 
offer: anonymity for both users and transactions; the ability to move illicit proceeds 
from one country to another quickly; low volatility, which results in lower exchange 
risk; widespread adoption in the criminal underground; and reliability.”22 This is a 
common objective of all criminal organizations, as concealing, astounding and securing 
are the most fundamental components of any illegal activity. Lately, noteworthy is also 
the use of cards. While generally cards allow worldwide withdrawal and transfer of 
money (Visa, MasterCard) through Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) of particular 
interest are the prepaid ones, as well as the PayPal system, primarily because they 
have replaced travellers’ checks as an alternative method to cross-border transfers of 
money and cannot be directly linked to an individual.  
The list of the applicable methods, however, is definitely a non-exhaustive one. They 
steadily emerge new and unforeseeable financing instruments by which terrorists can 
fund their activities. 
                                                     
21 FATF (2015), ‘Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks’ [2015] FATF, Paris 47, 33 <www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html>. 
22 ibid 35. 
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1.4 Disentangling Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing  
“The term ‘Money Laundering’ seems to have been coined in the U.S. in the 1920s 
when street gangs would seek a seemingly legitimate explanation for the origins of the 
money their rackets were generating”23 To perform their business, street gangs were 
undertaking retail service businesses operating basically with cash. The most common 
choices were clothes-laundries and car-washes – an incident that indicates the origin 
of the term. Having already identified money laundering among those illegal activities 
that might consist the source of the terrorist funds and also as one of the distribution 
methods, it is necessary to examine its particular characteristics and find out the clues 
that either connect or differentiate it frοm Terrorism Financing.  
Although since then, business has been profoundly altered, the nucleus of the crime 
remains the same. The origin of the term proves a lot about its objective and the 
methods set forth to achieve it. There is no doubt that “dirty money” is less profitable 
for its owner as it is hard to spend or invest it, if not previously “laundered”. 
Money laundering is the process through which money originating in illegal activities, 
usually criminalized under penal law, turns into legal capital. According to the 
definition of ML given by the United States Office of the Comptroller of Currency: 
‘Money is laundered to conceal criminal activity associated with it, including crimes 
that generate it…. Money laundering is driven by criminal activities. It conceals the true 
source of funds so that they can be used freely’. 
In other words, ML can be cut up into two main elements: it deals, if not with large, 
then at least with significant sums of money, extracting them from the official banking 
system and intending subsequently to re-insert them as legitimate amounts after 
having previously laundered them through various techniques so as to avoid raising 
suspicion on their origin.  
Regarding the relationship between ML and TF, it has to be clarified that none of these 
depends on the other. This is to say that although ML may consist a particle of 
fundamental importance to TF as a source of funds, the latter in many cases does not 
                                                     
23 Jack A Blum and others, ‘Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering’, vol 36 (1999) 12. 
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make any use of dirty money to fund its operations. Both crimes may exist 
simultaneously and independently from each other but may also be correlated.By way 
of explanation, TF is distinguished, as previously stated, to profitmaking and 
apportionment to its various activities.  ML on the adverse is not interested in 
exploring new channels for money making. Those, as well as the dirty capital, already 
exist. ML techniques endeavour to disguise the origin of the funds and in the rear, give 
them a legitimate appearance.  
The principal difference between the two concepts is that while ML’s purpose is to 
legitimise illegal funds so as to make them freely usable in the regulated system, TF 
does not aim to change the unlawful nature of its capital but rather to conceal its 
origin and disrupt the link between the nature of the money and its final destination or 
recipient, so as for the sum to be used for achieving the organization’s goals. After all, 
in TF the criminal action takes place after the collection of the funds and does not 
make a distinction between the legitimate or not origins of them.  
As far as it concerns the resemblance of the two concepts, the first common element 
to stand out is the intention of both ML and TF to disguise the origin of their sources 
for achieving each one its peculiar goals. Certainly, breaking the paths by obscuring the 
connecting lines is of utmost importance for terrorists as well as for launderers. 
Another similarity between ML and TF is noted in the way that they are confronted. In 
the case of ML, it is attempted to follow the money through “money trails” a method 
that “refers to the different routes used to conceal the criminal origin of assets earned 
in various illegal ways and to invest those assets in the legitimate economy and also to 
the investigative paths which authorities follow to track criminals and to seize their 
assets.”24 In reality, money trails are like financial fingerprints. This in practice means 
that the competent authorities endeavour to connect the dots so as to draw the line 
that leads to the source of the allegedly “dirty capital”. Similarly, in the case of TF, the 
combat includes tackling both the generation and the distribution process. However, 
due to the fact that the origin of the funds may be perfectly lawful and the sum may be 
                                                     
24 Ernesto U Savona and Michael A De Feo, ‘International Money Laundering Trends and 
Prevention/Control Policies’ in Ernesto U Savona (ed), Responding to money laundering: International 
perspectives (hardwood academic publishers 2005) 9. 
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agglomerated under any activity (sponsorships, donations etc) the attempt to strike 
the roots of the funds can hardly be efficient and if so, it would entail immense 
investment in inspection and control mechanisms. Alike in the fight against ML, the 
most effective policy against TF is to apply the “money trails” method and monitor the 
channels used for the allocation of suspicious funds. This tactic “could generate the 
positive cycle of pursuing the money, catching ‘big fish’, eliminating the funding 
channels and shifting the investigation to others who are exposed through the links 
with those originally apprehended”25  This assumption has already been verified by the 
researchers in identifying the accomplices and supporters of the 9/11 attack by 
employing relevant wire transfer data. Finally, in the fight against both crimes, the 
followed tactic is the same even if the target may differ.  
Summing up the analysis, examining in the parallel ML and TF we can sort out 
differences in their objectives and similarities on the methods they apply so as to 
achieve their goals in the backstage without raising suspicion. Undeniably there are 
affinities in the tactics used in the combat against them but certainly, each one has its 
own special characteristics that require a specialized approach.  
 
2. The role of the United Nations Security Council  
Prior to 9/11 terrorism financing was faced with hesitation and was not regarded as a 
separate offence at all. Nowadays the combat against it has been converted to one of 
the principal priorities not only for individual states but also for the international 
community. 
 In general terms, there are two main strategies to suppress terrorism financing. The 
first one refers to suppressing the money-making activities analysed previously and the 
second one targets the circulation of the funds until their final allocation. As far as it 
concerns the first strategy, its effectiveness is doubted and appears to be an even less 
attractive policy taking into consideration, as earlier stated, the enormous costs that 
                                                     
25 Koh 25. 
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accompany it. Taking this for granted, the second strategy seems to be a more credible 
solution because the stage of the distribution is more easily traceable. Follow the flow 
of the money backwards may lead to the brains of the terrorist group or at least to 
terrorists that are capable to share valuable information indicating crucial links.  
2.1 Critical UNSC Resolutions  
International problems need international solutions and this is exactly the reason why 
UNSC played such a fundamental role in the combat against terrorism and its 
financing.  During the period 1990-2000, with the end of the Cold War that had 
frustrated all attempts by the Security Council, “it finally became possible to develop 
an active policy of economic and financial sanctions against States, entities and even 
individuals”.26 
 During this period, the UNSC established several sanctions regimes through 
resolutions that incorporated embargoes orders on oil and diamonds as well as 
financial sanctions. The most influential between them has been the resolution 1373 
(2001) which is of a general character and sets forth the two basic obligations that bind 
UN’s member-states: criminalize the financing of terrorism on the one hand and freeze 
the procedures of the crime by applying suitable freezing and confiscation mechanisms 
along with the resolution 1267 (1999) which established the Sanctions Committee and  
introduced the obligation for the States to impose certain measures against people 
and entities indicated by the aforementioned authority.  
In other words, UNSC employed two action plans expressed through different 
resolutions. It attempted a structural approach of the offence in the resolution 
1373/2001 and an operational one under resolution 1267/1999 (later amended several 
times). 27 
                                                     
26 Sollier 42. 
27 “The key differences between 1373 and 1267 is the option given to UN Member States to establish 
autonomous lists of suspects, subject only to scrutiny by the Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Committee. Secondly, 1373 extended its scope beyond individuals and organisations affiliated to the 
Taliban and Al-Qaida to encompass all terrorist suspects. The EU promptly established an autonomous 
system without precedent by adopting measures5 providing the legal ground for listing terrorist 
suspects, freezing their assets and enabling police and judicial cooperation to prevent and combat 
terrorist acts. The EU has also tried to use its weight to include a counter-terrorism clause in existing and 
new development assistance instruments with third countries. The clause provides for cooperation in 
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2.1.1 Resolution 1373 (2001) 
Resolution 1373 (2001) has been very compelling from a political and legal aspect as it 
represents a “synthesis of many normative provisions and provides a new, unified and 
current expression of a body of rules which had been laid down in the past but whose 
implementation had been wholly unsatisfactory.” 28 The truth is that for the first time 
there has been a resolution aggregating the essence of the fight against terrorism 
financing. The reasons that this resolution stands out compared to the previously 
concluded are related to its provisions that are examined below.  
The 1373(2001) resolution introduced measures to construct a counter-terrorism 
infrastructure at international and national level. This resolution was adopted under 
the powers conferred to the UNSC by Chapter VII of the UN Charter that indicates that 
the UNSC is competent to make either a simple recommendation or a conclusive 
decision in order to maintain international peace and security. The UNSC binding 
decisions can be either non-forcible under Chapter VII article 41 or forcible, as military 
measures, under article 42. As specified in the Prosecutor v. Tadic case non-forcible 
measures, namely the ones that do not involve military actions, based on conclusive 
decisions made by the UNSC can variate and their catalogue is non-exhaustive. Most 
often the UNSC resorts to economic sanctions.  
The particularity of the resolution 1373 lies within the fact that it was the first one to 
recognise terrorism as a universal problem and to impose a global obligation binding 
all states to resist terrorism, condemn it and apply strategies to confront it effectively. 
Pointing out its basic characteristics, first of all it is binding as it was adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UNSC Charter that confers to the UNSC powers to mandate, 
secondly it is permanent because it sets provisions to combat terrorism in a period 
unlimited chronically and lastly is universal as it makes no distinction regarding 
addressees or the geographic regions. Indeed, this resolution does not only stick to 
countries but also to organizations, institutions and individuals each one of whom is 
burdened with the duty to confront terrorism. 
                                                                                                                                                           
the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts in the framework of Resolution 1373/2001 by 
exchanging information, know-how and experiences.” See Miriam Allam and Damian Gadzinowski, 
‘Combating the Financing of Terrorism: EU Policies, Polity and Politics’ (2009) 2 Eipascope 37, 39. 
28 Sollier 43. 
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The general framework of this resolution is segregated into four sections on the 
criterion of the proposed tactics. The objective of the first section is the suppression of 
terrorism financing, while in the second and the third section are included generic 
counter-terrorism measures at a national and international level respectively. Lastly, in 
the fourth section, the counter-terrorism campaign is spread to cover a broader area. 
All measures require structural reforms targeting to enhance the legal and institutional 
ability of the member states to adapt their administrative systems to the standards set 
by the resolution.  
Another novelty inserted by resolution 1373 is the establishment of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee (CTC) as a special permanent body operating under the UN 
relevant resolutions with the mandate to “suppress the provision of safe haven, 
sustenance or support for terrorists, share information with other governments on any 
groups practicing or planning terrorist acts, cooperate with other governments in the 
investigation, detection, arrest, extradition and prosecution of those involved in such 
acts”29. Nowadays, it has been evolved into the leading body, competent to promote 
collective action against terrorism and achieve the compliance of member states to the 
anti-terrorism UN resolutions and protocols. The CTC comprises all members of the 
Security Council and meets normally in closed sessions. Experts and third non-member 
countries can be invited by the Committee to take part in the discussion especially if 
those states’ interests are affected. The decision-making process requires consensus, 
which if it is not met, the controversy is submitted to the Security Council. The 
Committee renews its programme every 90 days while between its tasks is to facilitate 
dialogue with the UN member states, cooperate with experts through the lists that are 
submitted to it by the member states, review the member states reports and maintain 
transparency in its activities and close collaboration with other UN institutions and 
organs. 
Regardless its innovative nature, resolution 1373 (2001) has not escaped criticism 
principally based on the fact that the resolution does not clearly define terrorism. 
Indeed, a solid terrorism definition is considered as an absolute prerequisite so as to 
                                                     
29 United Nations Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/about-us/  
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delineate between other crimes and adopt an adequate policy against it.  Secondly, 
given that the measures proposed by the resolution impose certain restrictions on civil 
rights, there should have been applied counterbalances for the protection of sensitive 
human rights that could easily be violated. However, the resolution does not make any 
reference to this issue neither incorporates a protective framework. Lastly, although 
the resolution sets the objective and the suitable measures to achieve it, it does not 
designate the path to reach it. By way of explanation, its provisions lack completeness. 
For instance, it does not give any instructions to states of how to apply the freezing 
orders, how to manage the frozen assets or for how long they should maintain them. 
 Broadly speaking, despite its ground-breaking character, resolution 1373 was adopted 
under the light of the terrorist attack 9/11 that shocked the international community 
in a sense that emergency measures were adopted readily with a wide consensus 
without maybe satisfy all criteria set by international law. Solidarity and fear of 
terrorism that at that time intruded into the heart of the UN, made states oversight 
some details and procedural matters.  
2.1.2 Resolution 1267 (1999)  
The operational approach in the context of combating terrorism financing had been 
adopted for the first time in 1999 after the Taliban bombing attacks in the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  
It was the first time that the Security Council imposed among other measures, financial 
sanctions in the form of freezing orders on the Taliban regime. The innovative nature 
of this resolution lies within the fact that for the first time it was established the 
‘Sanctions Committee’ and the states were obliged to enforce freezing orders against 
entities and individuals without previous criminal procedures on the base of a list 
published by it. The initial list that was published and was targeting Taliban 
organizations was later modified several times and it is periodically being amended till 
today. Consequent resolutions framed Al-Qaida (1333/2000), established a monitoring 
group (1363/2001, 1526 (2004), 2253/2015 & 2368/2017) or plainly merged and 
revised old entries (1989/2011 & 2253/2015). One of the most critical resolutions in 
the combat against terrorism financing has been resolution 1390 (2002) which 
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practically extended the mandate of the previous 1267 resolution to apply not only to 
the Taliban but mostly to Usama bin Laden and the Al Qaida network that in that 
period had been expanding dramatically. Although by nature and by content the 
mandate of the resolution was specific and that for, temporary, namely its should 
expire as soon as the threat seized to exist, in practice it has been coverted to a 
permanent one, given that the fight against Al Qaida has not been won yet. The 
resolution amended also the provisions on the Sanctions Committee and its role. 
The Sanctions Committee30, a Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 
1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and 
associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities (hereafter “the Committee”), 
inspects the sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council. The Committee was 
initially established to impose financial sanctions on Taliban but its mandate was 
expanded (by resolution 1390) so as to include other terrorist groups and individuals 
that threaten international peace and security or terrorist organizations such as Al 
Qaida and ISIL.  Particularly, the 1989 (2011) resolution of the Security Council 
conferred the competency to monitor the implementation of the sanctions on Al Qaida 
and its associated members (entities or individuals), while the 1988 (2011) resolution 
allocated responsibilities related to the implementation measures regarding the region 
of Afghanistan. More recently the 2253 (2015)31 resolution amplified the mandate of 
the Committee and the listing criteria32 framing ISIL. Lately the Security Council 
refurbished the measures applying already to individuals and entities included in the 
ISIL and Al Qaida sanctions list by adopting resolution 2368 (2017)33.  
The operating procedure applied by the Committee is very similar to the one of the 
CTC. It meets in closed sessions, where all Member-States participate and third states 
may be invited ad hoc, it also takes decisions by consensus and is obliged to submit 
                                                     
30 Alternatively referred as Committee 1267 
31 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 2253 (2015) S/RES/2253’, vol 2253 (2015) 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2253%282015%29>. 
32 The criteria for adding a name to the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List are also outlined in 
paragraphs 2 to 4 of resolution 2368 (2017).  
33 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 2368 (2017) S/RES/2368’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2368(2017)>. 
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periodical reports to the Security Council referring to the implementation of the 
measures.  
The role of the Committee is among others to “oversee the implementation of the 
sanctions measures, designate individuals and entities who meet the listing criteria set 
out in the relevant resolutions, consider and decide upon notifications and requests 
for exemptions from the sanctions measures or requests to remove”34. Summing all 
these competencies up, the Sanctions Committee is mandated to act as a UNSC body 
bound to carry out the inspection process and the application of the resolution in 
practice.  
The sanctions which the Committee may impose are divided into three categories: 
asset freezing orders, travel bans and arms embargoes. These measures apply to the 
individuals and entities whose names are referred to in the List of the Committee. 
States are required to apply automatically the respective measures without any delay, 
immediately after the listing of the individual or the entity. This listing follows the 
request submitted by a Member State and takes place on the basis of certain criteria 
that are examined by the Committee.  
In reality, after listing has occurred, states are supposed to comply without revising the 
reasons upon which the listing was decided. States do not enjoy any discretion on the 
implementation of the measures adopted by the Security Council, an issue that has 
caused vast discussions and extended debate. The reason is that the listing procedure 
has some drawbacks upon which has been heavily criticized for lacking effective 
human rights’ protection warranties and for conflicting with EU law, an issue that is 
going to be discussed further below.  
In an effort to satisfy uniformity, the Committee approved an explanation of each 
measure on 24th of February 2015. The explanatory note includes the definition of the 
terms, their objective and scope, describes the proceeds of the crime and establishes 
exemptions to the applicability of the proposed measures (regarding the first two 
categories). 
                                                     
34 Security Council Subsidiary Organs. Available at  
<www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/work-and-mandate> 
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2.2 Measures imposed by the Sanctions’ Committee 
2.2.1 Freezing of Funds  
According to the paragraph 1 of the resolution 2161 (2014) that applies to individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities whose names are referred to in the Al-Qaida 
Sanctions List of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and in conjunction with resolution 
2253 (2015) that expands the provisions to ISIL organization: 
 “Member States are obliged to freeze without delay the funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf 
or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, 
financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or 
indirectly for such persons’ benefit, or by their nationals or by persons 
within their territory”35. 
In other words, as soon as, on the Committee´s decision, the name of a person or an 
entity is linked to the existence or the activity of the said organizations fulfilling the 
certain listing criteria, the Member States as recipient of the Committee´s decisions, 
are compelled to suspend their financing by any means available to them. It is the 
aftereffect, namely the exclusion from available funds, that concerns the Security 
Council and not how this will be succeeded. It is pursued a complete derivation of 
financial resources no matter if the frozen funds come from a legal or an illegal activity.  
Freezing, however, should be distinguished from confiscation. Thus, while “seizure 
means that the competent government authority has the authorization to take control 
of the specified funds or assets and ‘confiscation’ or ‘forfeiture’ means that the 
competent authority has the authorization to transfer ownership of the specified funds 
or assets to the country itself”36, freezing must be conceived under a distinct context. 
                                                     
35 UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, ‘Asset Freeze: Explanation of Terms Approved on 24 
February 2015’ 1 
<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/eot_assets_freeze_-_english.pdf>. 
36 Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (2006) ch IX 5 <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/swansea/Doc?id=10106737>  
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Indeed, the frozen property neither becomes part of the public property nor an actual 
seizure takes place. The element that discerns freezing is that it does not crop up any 
transfer of the property, which remains under the name of the listed person or entity 
but it is as if it had never existed given that it can be controlled neither by them nor by 
anyone else.  
Of course, the Sanctions Committee provides for certain exemptions to the freezing of 
assets under strict criteria that refer to the real financial situation of the recipients and 
their concrete basic expenses (alimentation, medical insurance expenses, taxes, 
mortgage etc) that are absolutely necessary for their living and the fulfilment of legal 
financial obligations. The exemption corresponds to a pre-fixed amount approved by 
the Committee after a relevant request submitted to it by the state that is competent 
to give access to the frozen capital. The basic expenses exemption is set under the 
resolution 1452 (2002) as amended by paragraph 15 of resolution 1735 (2006) and 
Section 11 (d) of the Committee’s guidelines37.   
 Another category of exemptions that may be furnished to the listed person or entity is 
in case of extraordinary expenses that may occur and is examined ad hoc by the 
Committee. The procedure followed is the same as in the case of basic expenses and is 
regulated by resolution 1452(2002) and paragraph 11 (d) of the Committee’s 
guidelines38.   
Regarding the unfreezing of the frozen assets as a whole, this is only possible after the 
delisting of the listed person or entity. Although this can be achieved through a formal 
request either by a Designating State or by another Member-State39,  critical is the role 
of the Ombudsperson office, that is competent to receive and review the requests for 
removal from the Sanctions’ Committee list by individual persons or entities without 
the interference of a state.  
                                                     
37 UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, ‘Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work’ 
(2016) <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/committee-guidelines>. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 7. 
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2.2.2 Travel bans 
Travel bans are the second measure that the Committee imposes as result of the 
listing of an individual as a person related to ISIL or Al Qaida. This measure designates 
a restriction of entry or transition through the national territory of a Member State. By 
nature, this measure refers to natural persons that attempt to travel crossing national 
borders by any means. It is an absolute prohibition and does not distinguish duration 
of the passage nor valid visa permission.  
According to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 2161 (2014)40, the travel ban is bounding for 
the Member States unless it affects the state’s own nationals, who cannot be deprived 
of their right to enter and transit through their national frontiers, or unless the 
entrance/transition is considered to be indispensable for fulfilment of judicial 
proceedings.  In addition to those two exceptions, there is an option for exemption 
guaranteed by the Committee itself subject to an ad hoc evaluation of the case. For 
instance, as indicated by paragraph 9 of resolution 2161 (2014) in conjunction with 
section 12 paragraph (o) of the Guidelines of the Committee, “it is possible for listed 
individuals to apply for a travel ban exemption for necessary travel such as medical or 
humanitarian need, or the performance of religious obligations”41. However, in such a 
case the Committee can decide under its absolute discretion and either satisfy the 
request or deny the exemption on the set basis.  
2.2.3 Arms Embargoes  
Arms embargoes are the last measure designated by the Sanctions’ Committee 
employed against listed entities and individuals. It was introduced for the first time by 
paragraph 2 of resolution 1390 (2002) and reiterated in subsequent resolutions until 
2161 (2014), that refers to this measure in paragraph 1 (c). As a term, it must be 
conceived broadly so as to include not only supply of arms and military equipment but 
also all those services that could give to the listed person or undertaking access to 
technical assistance or even advice related to military activities. The objective of the 
                                                     
40 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 2161 (2014) S/RES/2161’ 
<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2161>. 
41 UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, ‘Travel Ban: Explanation of Terms Approved on 24 February 
2015’ 1 para 24. 
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provision is to cause “starvation” to terrorist organizations by depriving them of access 
to weaponry of all kinds and services that could facilitate their activities. In addition, it 
is proposed by paragraph 14 of resolution 2161 (2014), the exercise of special vigilance 
on nationals that are involved in the construction and trade of products that may be 
used for the manufacturing of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and unconventional 
weapons.  
Interestingly, in the case of arms embargoes, there is no provision for exceptions. 
“When the arms embargo was first imposed under resolution 1333 (2000), it applied 
only to transfers to the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control, and included an 
exemption for humanitarian or protective use.”42 Though, in resolution 1390 (2002) 
and in the subsequent resolutions until today this exception has been removed. As a 
result, the arms embargo affects all entities and individuals listed by the Sanctions’ 
Committee. This choice reaffirms the eminently obligatory character of this measure 
and imposes to the States a high priority obligation of fundamental importance, i.e. to 
monitor this field closely and employ any adequate method in order to satisfy the 
objective of the measure.  
2.3 The Office of the Ombudsperson  
The Office of the Ombudsperson is an independent and impartial body created to 
satisfy the need for effective protection of the right for access to justice. Through the 
competencies of the Ombudsperson, the listed individuals and the entities have the 
opportunity to challenge their listing. 
The Office was created by Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) and its mandate was 
subsequently extended by resolution 1989 (2011), resolution 2083 
(2012), resolution 2161 (2014), resolution 2253 (2015) and resolution 2368 (2017). 
Under its current status, it is charged with the accumulation of information and 
interaction with the petitioner in order to gather all essential material and issue its 
report to the Committee. Although in its report may be encompassed a 
recommendation for delisting, it has no binding effect as eventually, the Committee 
                                                     
42 UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, ‘Arms Embargo: Explanation of Terms Approved oUnited 
Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’ 1 para 9 
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decides upon discretion, having though taken into consideration the Ombudsperson’s 
report and recommendation. 
2.4 Monitoring Team 
The Sanctions’ Committee is supported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL 
(Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.  
 The role of the Monitoring Team is described in resolution 2255 (2015)43 and its 
mandate was extended by resolution 2368 (2017) until December 202144. Among 
others the Monitoring Team is supposed to submit reports to the Committee on the 
implementation of the measures, assist Ombudsperson, consult with Member States 
and United Nations agencies and provide with recommendations following case 
studies pursued by it.  
3. Financial Action Task Force  
The Financial Action Task Force was established in 1989 by the G7 Summit as an 
intergovernmental body with the mandate to combat Money Laundering. Its mandate 
was “to assess the results of cooperation already undertaken, in order to prevent the 
utilization of the banking system and financial institutions for the purpose of money 
laundering, and to consider additional preventive efforts in this field, including the 
adaptation of the legal and regulatory systems so as to enhance the multilateral 
judicial assistance.”45 Among its duties has been the preparation of annual reports on 
the efforts made by countries worldwide in the field of AML adopted policies. Of great 
importance has been the report, published on June 22, 2000, that named fifteen 
countries and territories with indicators of lack of a serious commitment to 
                                                     
43 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2255 (2015)’ paras 51–52 and Annex 
<http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/N1544502_EN.pdf>. 
44 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 2368 (2017) S/RES/2368’ para 94. 
45 Eduardo Aninat, Daniel Hardy and R Barry Johnston, Combating Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism, vol 39 (World Bank and International Monertary Fund 2002) 23. 
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confronting effectively money laundering46. According to this report “the jurisdictions 
(non-cooperating countries) either failed to adopt meaningful legislation criminalizing 
laundering or have serious deficiencies in their banking laws and implementing 
regulations”47. Although in the 1990s the FATF had already begun its work in the field 
of Money Laundering publishing Forty Recommendations, it was only in 2001 when 
was involved in the fight against Terrorism Financing addressing Eight Special 
Recommendations and a Ninth in 2004 regarding cash couriers48.  
Today FATF has thirty-five member states, its Plenary meets three times per year and 
its core functions are the following: “setting standards and ensuring their 
implementation in its member countries, studying the techniques and typologies of 
money laundering and terrorist financing and conducting outreach activities that aim 
to spread the standards globally”49. In other words, its task is to study the evolution of 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, subsequently to endeavour new 
techniques in the fight for their suppression and finally monitor the implementation of 
the measures by the states.  
The FATF Recommendations are soft-law and include minimum CTF and AML measures 
that the countries must incorporate in their legal system. It is worth mentioning that 
the Recommendations have as a reference point the Terrorist Financing Convention, 
but they put emphasis on the resolutions of the UNSC, the context of which consider 
as the core legislative measure that all states must adopt. As stated in the recently 
published FATF report “countries should implement targeted financial sanctions 
                                                     
46 “States that are found to be seriously failing to adhere to the standards in the original 40 
Recommendations and nine Special Recommendations are liable to be placed on a list of Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT). Whilst not a sanction, this has proved to be a powerful 
tool to ensure compliance as it can be a major deterrent for investment by foreign businesses, banks 
and financial services.” Culley 8–9. 
47 William R Schroeder, ‘MONEY LAUNDERING: A Global Threat and the International Community’s 
Response’ FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 1, 6. 
48 (9) Special Recommendations: I. Ratification and implementation of UN instruments related to 
financing of terrorism II. Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering III. 
Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets IV. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism V. 
International cooperation relating to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations 
VI. Requirements for alternative remittance transfers VII. Requirements for wire transfers VIII. 
Requirements for non-profit organizations IX. Requirements for cash couriers. 
49 Aninat, Hardy and Johnston 24. 
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regimes to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to the 
prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing”50. 
4. The European approach towards the “war on terror”  
At a European level, terrorist financing currently constitutes one the principal 
priorities51 taking into consideration the conditions after the numerous terrorist 
attacks that took place in the European territory during the last few years52.  
On 20 May 2015 were adopted by the Commission both the Fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (2015/849)53 and the Fund Transfers Regulation (2015/847)54. 
This two-tier framework is employed to suppress terrorist financing and money 
laundering by facilitating cooperation and information exchange up to full traceability 
between national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) aiming to track down suspicious 
money transfers and designate a common European policy adopted toward third 
countries, not members of the EU, that are recognised as of high risk territories due to 
their deficient anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing scheme. In 
addition, it obliges the states to facilitate the identification of beneficial owners and 
provide for enhanced customer due diligence measures to be applied by competent 
                                                     
50 FATF (2012-2017), ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation’ FATF, Paris, France 11 <www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.html>. 
51 One reason why it has been so difficult for the EU to cooperate on CFT is because security policy 
belongs to hard politics. At the heart of the matter are therefore issues of state sovereignty. The term 
“war on terror”, first coined by President George W. Bush shortly after the 9/11 attacks, illustrates well 
that the discourse around the politics of CFT has quickly concentrated on survival. See Allam and 
Gadzinowski 38. 
52 “A range of associated initiatives have been taken in order to ensure the appropriate satisfaction of 
international standards The catalyst for such measures has been the FATF Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing.[…] Apart from the important issues that the adoption of international standards by 
the Community raises regarding the protection of fundamental rights, the willingness of the Community 
institutions and Member States to keep up with, but also to go beyond, international initiatives by 
Community law, has resulted in a series of constitutional dilemmas for the European 
Community.”Valsamis Mitsilegas and Bill Gilmore, ‘The EU Legislative Framework against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards’ (2007) 
56(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 119, 139.  
53 European Parliament and of the Council, ‘Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of 
Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing’ (2015) L141 Official 
Journal of the European Union 73. 
54 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Regulation 2015/847of 20 May 2015 on on 
Information Accompanying Transfers of Funds and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006’ (2015) L 
141 Official Journal of the European Union. 
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entities especially under circumstances that due to their nature present a greater risk 
or lastly to maintain a record basis of minimum duration of five years containing all 
crucial information gathered and related to the payer and the payee.  
Following the “Panama Papers” revelation, in July 2016, the Commission decided to 
strengthen even more its framework so as to ensure heightened transparency of 
payments and money transfers that could lead to the identification of terrorist threats. 
According to the Commission’s press release on the proposed modification of the 
Directive, all amendments aim at “ensuring a high level of safeguards for financial 
flows from high-risk third countries, enhancing the access of Financial Intelligence 
Units to information, including centralised bank account registers, and tackling 
terrorist financing risks linked to virtual currencies and pre-paid cards”55. 
Consequently, the proposed amendments do not constitute a novelty at all56. On the 
contrary, it is attempted to apply measures and techniques such as risk assessment 
obligations for certain professional categories, already common in the field of money 
laundering, against terrorist financing. All amendments are aiming to strengthen the 
already strict framework and establish unity, close cooperation and mutual recognition 
throughout the European Union. 
5. The conflict between the International and the EU legal order 
There is a vast discussion on the role of the United Nations regarding the fight against 
the financing of terrorism and its relationship with the EU legal order57. The reason 
                                                     
55 European Commission, ‘Commission Press Release IP/17/1732 on “Strengthened EU Rules to Tackle 
Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Terrorism Financing Enter into Force”’ (European Commission 
Press Release Database, 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1732_en.htm>. 
56 Nevertheless, the proposed amendments are expected to increase cooperation in the field of asset 
freezing or confiscating. The new framework of mutual recognitions of freezing orders between the 
member states will prevent terrorists from using their funds to commit further attacks. “A proposed 
Regulation on mutual recognition of criminal asset freezing and confiscation orders will offer one single 
legal instrument for the recognition of both freezing and confiscation orders in other EU countries, 
simplifying the current legal framework; moreover, the Regulation would apply immediately in all 
Member States” See EU Focus, ‘Commission Adopts Stronger Rules to Fight Terrorism Financing’ [2017] 
EU Focus 29, 30  
57 The ECJ adopted a sharply dualist tone in its approach to the international legal order and to the 
relationship between EC law and international law, identifying with the reasoning and approach of the 
US Supreme Court in case Medellin v Texas 552 U.S.  (2008). This case of course dealt not with Security 
Council resolutions but with a judgment of the International Court of Justice, which the Supreme Court 
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behind the supposed conflict refers to the violation of fundamental human rights 
secured and protected by the primary law of the European Union that are considered 
to constitute its legal nucleus.  
It is a fact that the Security Council, when deciding on imposing restrictive measures 
and smart sanctions to individuals or entities allegedly being connected with terrorist 
organizations, acts as an ultimate power mandating the necessary measures that the 
Member-States are obliged to apply immediately. The SC enjoys wide discretion in 
identifying situations that fall within the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
further on designating its own action. It is commonly admitted that the function of the 
SC and its limits of discretion compose a problematic reality where no effective check 
and balances system applies. The argument that the SC acts as a ‘legibus solutus’ fell in 
vain because of jus cogens, i.e. peremptory norms of international law that must be 
respected by all states and organizations.  Accepting that international law principles 
do not bind international organization creates an oxymoron as if we admitted that 
international affairs are outside the scope of the law. 
 The SC background indicates that in the late ‘40s, when the body was created in order 
to act as a dispute settler in the aftermath of the Second World War, nobody imagined 
the way these powers would emerge to encompass law-making and quasi-judicial 
activities to the body that was initially designated to safeguard international peace and 
security and prevent another war. It is clear that, as a matter of international law, the 
UN Charter takes precedence over the domestic law of its Member-States and such 
primacy extends to UNSC resolutions.  Thus, the issue of how EU law complies with the 
international law supremacy was discussed extensively by the European Courts.  
                                                                                                                                                           
found not to be enforceable in the US without prior congressional action. The Kadi ruling goes further 
than Medellin in certain respects in that while the Supreme Court in Medellin made clear that 
Congressional action could be taken to enforce the international obligation in question, the nature of 
the ECJ ruling in Kadi means that the EU Council. See Gráinne Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and 
the International Legal Order After Kadi (2010)’ (2011) 262 Harvard International Law Journal 243, 2 
<http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:The+European+Court+of+Justice+an
d+the+International+Legal+Order+after+Kadi#0>. See also the earlier Supreme Court ruling on a closely 
related set of issues in Sanchez Llamas v Oregon 548 U.S. 331 (2006),. And see S. Koh “Respectful 
Consideration” After Sanchez-Llamas V. Oregon: Why the Supreme Court Owes More to the 
International Court of Justice” Cornell LR Vol 93 243-273 (2007). Also A. Aleinikoff “Transnational 
Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy” (2008) 33 Yale J. Int’l L 479 
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The conflict between the role acquired by the SC in the fight against terrorism 
financing and the constitutional principles of the EU was inaugurated in 2001 by an 
individual whose assets were frozen, as a result of the smart sanctions regime and the 
inclusion in the Sanctions Committee consolidated list of persons and entities 
associated with terrorism. The applied legislative practice found judicial endorsement 
Kadi case, which ended up before the CFI and at a second stage before ECJ58.   
Practically, the ECJ  annulled the decision of the CFI tumbling the essence of its whole 
judgement on the relationship between international and European legal order on the 
one hand and on the breach of fundamental human rights committed by the ruling of 
the SC on the other hand.  Thus, the CFI held that Article 308 in conjunction with 
Articles 301 and 60 gave power to the Council to adopt the contested regulation59 and 
additionally perceived that due to the fact that the EU is, in a derivative way, bound by 
the UN Charter, there is no limitation to the Court’s competency to check indirectly the 
internal lawfulness of the UN adopted resolutions on the basis of jus cogens, which are 
conceived as “mandatory provisions concerning the universal protection of human 
rights, from which neither the Member States nor the bodies of the United Nations 
                                                     
58 “It will be recalled that the contested by Mr Kadi regulations were adopted on the combined basis of 
Articles 301, 60 and 308 EC. Article 301 EC fulfils a distinct function in the EU architecture. It empowers 
the Community to take action to serve CFSP objectives, thus enabling a transition (passarelle) from the 
second to the first pillar and providing a bridge between inter-governmentalism and Community 
methodology. Since 2000, the Council has adopted a liberal interpretation of Article 301 relying on it to 
adopt smart sanctions, i.e. sanctions targeting individuals and non-state actors. An example is provided 
by the sanctions regime against Mr Milosevic, the former President of Yugoslavia” See Takis Tridimas 
and Jose A Guitierrez-Fons, ‘EU Law, International Law, and Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: The 
Judiciary in Distress?’ (2008) 32 Fordham International Law Journal 660, 5. 
59 “The issue of Community competence is highly problematic and Kadi can justly be seen as a borderline 
case. There are, in fact, powerful arguments against Community competence. Granting to the 
Community a broad power to impose such sanctions means, inevitably, less democracy since sanctions 
can find their way to the national statute book directly from the UN Sanctions Committee without going 
through any kind of parliamentary control at national or EU level. Under Articles 301 and 60 EC, 
economic sanctions are adopted by the Council on a proposal from the Commission without any 
involvement on the part of the European Parliament. Article 308 provides for the consultation of the 
Parliament but this is a benign input since the Council is not required to follow Parliament’s opinion. By 
virtue of Article 249 EC, the contested regulation became part of the law of the land in each of the 
Member States from the time of its entry into force without the need for any implementing measures. 
Indeed, English courts have refused to question its validity in the light of the CFI’s ruling in Kadi: see M v 
HM Treasury [2006] EWCH 2328.” See ibid 11. 
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may derogate because they constitute 'intransgressible principles of international 
customary law'”60. Indeed, the latter comprise the limit to the resolutions of the UN.  
In the light of these considerations, the CFI overruled the allegations of the applicant, 
Mr Kadi, regarding the impact of the freezing order to his property right. The CFI found 
that it was only a temporary precautionary measure necessary under certain 
circumstances, that would be reviewed periodically and consequently, there was not 
any arbitrary deprivation that would equal violation of the substance of the right given 
the existence of circumstances that may justify exceptions from the measure. 
Secondly, the claim referring to the right to be heard, was also turned down by the CFI 
on the basis that this right is correlated to the exercise of discretion by the authority. 
However, the Commission itself was not acting as such. Also held that even though the 
right to be heard by the Sanctions’ Committee, is not provided, the re-examination 
procedure establishes an effective protective framework. Lastly, the CFI examining the 
alleged violation of the right to effective judicial review, found that this has not the 
character of an absolute right and thus, can be restricted on public emergency reasons 
or limitations within the scope of state immunity61 doctrine.  
The ECJ adopted a totally divergent approach towards the same pleas62. It took the 
view that the contested sanctions could be adopted on the combined legal basis of 
Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC but for reasons different from those accepted by the CFI63. 
Even though the two Courts agreed on the fact that they are competent to judge on 
the conflict between the UN resolutions and the international law principle of jus 
cogens and recognised that the EU must respect the international law and exercise its 
powers in its light conforming with the SC resolutions when it comes for the 
                                                     
60 Case T-315/01Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities (2005) T-315/01 3659 [231]. See also Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
of 8 July 1996, The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Reports 1996, p. 226, paragraph 
79; see also, to that effect, Advocate General Jacobs's Opinion in Bosphorus, paragraph 189 above, 
paragraph 65. 
61 ibid 288. 
62 For an extensive commentary on the judgment and on other related European Court of Justice rulings 
on anti-terrorist sanctions see P.T.Tridimas and J.A. Gutierrez-Fons “EU Law, International Law and 
Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress?” Fordham International Law Journal, 
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271302  
63 It reasoned that, although Articles 60 and 301 authorised only sanctions against states, recourse to 
Article 308 could be made to extend their limited ambit ratione materiae, provided that the other 
conditions for its applicability were satisfied. See Tridimas and Guitierrez-Fons 10. 
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maintenance of international peace and security, the ECJ noted that the Charter of the 
UN does not impose a particular model of implementation of the respective 
resolutions. Consequently, held that the European Committee regulations cannot be 
exempted from an internal judicial review of their lawfulness by virtue that they have 
intended to give effect to an SC resolution. Moreover, it observed that according to 
paragraph 7 of article 300 of the UN Charter, the primacy of the UN law provisions 
does not extend to primary EU law.  
With regard to the breach of the rights of defence, the ECJ distinguished between the 
right to be heard and the right to access to effective judicial review. Apropos of the 
first, the ECJ admitted that the Community authorities cannot be required to 
communicate the grounds upon which the SC decided the inclusion of the person or 
the entity into the consolidated list because otherwise, any publicity of critical 
information would jeopardise the effectiveness of the method removing its surprise 
effect. Though, according to its judgement it is “task of the Community judicature to 
apply, in the course of the judicial review it carries out, techniques which 
accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate security concerns about the nature and 
sources of information taken into account in the adoption of the act concerned and, on 
the other, the need to accord the individual a sufficient measure of procedural 
justice”64. Since the Community authorities did not take any action against safety 
considerations and given that the SC never informed the appellants about the 
evidence used against them, they were not in a position to defend themselves pointing 
out their version. As a result, the infringement of their right to be heard was not 
further contested.  
With respect to the second aspect of the right to defence, namely the right to effective 
judicial review, the ECJ pinpointed that the appellants ignored the grounds on which 
their listing was decided. Besides, the re-examination procedure before Sanctions 
Committee did not judicial protection guarantees nor the available diplomatic 
protection ensured maintenance of the rights. Therefore, according to the judgement 
                                                     
64 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P YassinYassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (2008) C-
402/05 P [344]. 
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of the ECJ, the crucial “regulation was adopted according to a procedure in which the 
appellants’ rights of defence were not observed, which has had the further 
consequence that the principle of effective judicial protection has been infringed”65.  
Additionally, the ECJ reaffirmed the finding of the CFI that the right to the property is 
not an absolute one and may be restricted under conditions or in situations that 
threaten public safety and peace. However, it emphasized on the proportionality 
principle, perceiving that it is prerequisite that there will be maintained a balance 
between public interest and interest of individuals. In the case of Kadi this criterion 
was in principle fulfilled (objective of the measure, temporary nature, periodical re-
examination, derogation and exceptions) but since there still was no chance for the 
appellant to bring his case to the competent authorities, it was assessed that the 
restriction of his right was disproportionate and unjustified.  
From all the facts taken into consideration by the ECJ in the light of Kadi case, it is 
deducted the puzzling connection between indispensable human rights66 that are 
located in the core of the European legal protection regime and overriding concerns on 
terrorism intimidating international safety, peace and security67.  
                                                     
65 ibid 352. 
66 In its decision Al-Dulimi and Montana Management inc. v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) stated, for the first time, that the level of protection of human rights within the United 
Nations ‘smart sanctions’ system was insufficient. It attempted the application of the ‘equivalent 
protection test’ that it first developed regarding the European Union, notably in the famous Bosphorus 
judgment. [This test may be defined as the legal reasoning which allows a court to review the level of 
protection of certain fundamental principles (which it has a duty to uphold), and especially human 
rights, in another legal system and which can result in judicial immunity for measures adopted by this 
other legal system, in varying degrees and under a variety of different circumstances, if the court 
considers that the said principles are protected in an equivalent manner in the other system.] Though 
the Court concluded that there is no significant convergence of courts applying the equivalent 
protection test to the United Nations, and the ECtHR itself has in fact been very reluctant to apply this 
test to the United Nations. For more details see Sebastien Platon, ‘The “equivalent Protection Test”: 
From European Union to United Nations, from Solange II to Solange I (with Reference to the Al-Dulimi 
and Montana Management Inc v Switzerland Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights)’ (2014) 
10(2) European Constitutional Law Review 226. 
67 Still the relationship between the EU and the UN legal orders remains highly problematical.  On this 
matter it is worth seeing the CFI’s judgment in T-228/02, PMOI v Council judgment of 12 December 
2006, where the Council refused to de-list the People’s Mojahedin of Iran Organization despite the 
Court’s ruling that the listing was not justified. A legal opinion was consequently (September 18, 2008) 
signed by five senior international lawyers challenging the Council’s non-compliance with the CFI ruling 
as a serious misuse of powers and a breach of the EC Treaty. See ‘Summary of Legal Opinions about the 
Maintaining of the PMOI on the EU Asset Freeze’ 
42 
 
Critical Appraisal 
Since their creation, United Nations have been charged with the maintenance of the 
international peace and security and the suppression of events that threaten them, 
with the purpose of preventing armed conflicts and settling disputes. They have played 
a cardinal role in handling the complicated issues that burst forth. Beyond the shadow 
of a doubt, the UN, through their various specialists’ Committees, as well as through 
the Security Council, hold the necessary mechanisms to address an effective strategy 
in a field where it is difficult to achieve a consensus.  
Nevertheless, the evolution of the Security Council to a body competent to deal with 
terrorism is indeed raising issues regarding the real nature of the resolutions. The 
unequal states’ representation as well as the lack of transparency in the way by which 
SC imposes its measures and the absence of legal culture in it have provoked intense 
disambiguation on whether the SC is the suitable international body to decide upon 
such complex issues.  
Practically the UNSC takes on in cases where an impending threat to safety is detected. 
However, the notion of what in reality may threaten international security, remains 
doubtful, especially if we take into consideration the humanitarian crisis, the current 
conditions in the Middle East, the political instability in a big number of countries 
worldwide and imminent refugees flows.  Interestingly, the role of the SC in the 
combat against terrorism financing is dual: firstly, it is competent to decide upon what 
actually constitutes a threat and subsequently claim its competency to impose 
measures against it.  
Decisive has been the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that in fact, agglomerated 
and intensified the competencies and the powers of the SC that recognised terrorism 
as a continuous menace to the humanity. Still, there is a contradiction at this point. 
Since under Chapter VII the threats are conceived to be time-limited, there is no path 
to justify the indefinite action of the SC in the field of terrorism financing, without 
specifying and particularizing the emerging hazard. Even if we accept the theory of 
emergency analogy in the case the SC, it can still be argued that Chapter VII is already 
an emergency exception to the general rules of procedure of the UN. Additionally, 
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although the adopted measures themselves must be temporary so as not to breach 
fundamental human rights, the anti-terrorist mechanisms applied by the SC, no matter 
if they are periodically revised, they are initially adopted for an infinite period, and 
cumbersomely being removed or reviewed judicially.  
Following all these considerations we can hardly regard the action of the SC as the best 
possible way to dominate the fight for the suppression of the financing of terrorism 
and terrorism itself. The lack of checks and balances in the system that the SC 
commands combined with the defects mentioned previously, justifiably have provoked 
scepticism. As characteristically Judge Fitzmaurice stated in his dissident opinion 
attached to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Namibia: “It was to keep the peace and not 
to change the world order that the Security Council was set up”68. In the light of the 
previous thoughts, it has been an admissible judgement for the ECJ to acquiesce a 
violation of the rights in the case of Kadi.  
Yet, on the other side, it could not be oversight the fact that the choice of the SC as the 
body empowered to take the leading role in the fight against terrorism and its 
financing, is not absurd. The SC is the only promising body with guarantees of 
effectiveness in an ambit where traditional law-making mechanisms are proved to be 
impotent due to their time-consuming processes. Neither, the alternative of a 
multilateral treaty can satisfy the urgent need of immediate decisive action, given the 
prerequisite of burdensome negotiations, the risk of lack of unanimity and the 
likelihood to fall into vain in case of shortfall of signatories.  Lastly, invoking customary 
rules in this particular field is of contingent practicality because of the involvement of 
criminal conduct and also due to the absence of the two fundamental elements that 
comprise customary law, i.e. generality of practice and opinio juris action.  
In order to justify SC’s practice are employed doctrines such as of implied powers and 
subsequent practices. In fact, the theoretical discussions regarding the limits of powers 
of the SC in this field remain fruitless since there is no suggestion on a pertinent 
                                                     
68 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Measures: 
The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion’ (2006) 17(5) European Journal of International Law 881, 887 
<https://legalresearch.westlaw.co.uk/>. Also see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, [1971] ICJ Rep 291, at 294, para. 115. 
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alternative plan that would allow an equally compelling strategy respecting 
humanitarian provisions of international law.  As it has been successfully noticed, after 
all “the ultimate test of the legitimacy of the SC's action remains the level of 
acceptance of its practice by the UN Member-States”69 and until today the SC 
resolutions enjoy sufficient approbation within the international community.  
In my point of view, having overcome the academic debate, the international 
community as a whole, as well as the states independently should focus on solving the 
technical defects of the already existing system. This means, deepen the knowledge 
regarding new financial instruments and explore new methods of how those could be 
used in the battle against terrorism. The challenge is the development of new 
methodological tools and the acquisition of a level of uniformity in their application by 
states with varying levels of maturity in their financial systems. 
Epilogue  
In the present thesis, it was attempted the presentation of the International and the 
European scheme employed in the battle against terrorism and its financing. There 
have been introduced the methods by which the SC struggles to handle the constantly 
new challenges in the field of terrorism financing. Additionally, it was brought up the 
debate on the lawfulness of its action taking into consideration human rights’ 
protective framework and the position of the EU, as deducted by the judgement of its 
Courts in the influential case of Kadi.  
As concluded by the previous analysis, the role of the United Nations and, in particular, 
of their Security Council, has been vital for the suppression of the phenomenon 
especially after 2001, when its mandate was expanded. Nowadays, the existence of 
specialists’ bodies such as the FATF as well as the cooperation of national FIUs is 
regarded as a crucial element in the counter-terrorism efforts. The evolution of 
adequate policies and the modernization of the existing financial systems and 
instruments comprise indispensable part of the proposed policy.    
                                                     
69 ibid.  
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Despite the debate related to the lack of sufficient guarantees offered by the SC for 
the protection of human rights during its action in the field of suppressing terrorism 
financing, the truth is that until this moment, the SC owns by far the most effective 
techniques and the necessary know-how. Undeniably there are key improvements that 
could be introduced in the current decision and “law-making” process that, though, 
require collaborative efforts by the international community and active participation in 
good faith of states, with the purpose of moving beyond arbitrary self-seeking policies 
and altogether confront this menace that should be every state’s concern.  
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